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NEWS BRIEFS
ENTERING CLASS — From over 1,200 applications, 179 students were registered at Marshall-Wythe
on September 9, 1971. Associate Dean John E. Donaldson reports that this represents a 60% increase in applications as compared with a projected national
rise of 40% this year. The entering class is divided
almost equally between Virginia and out-of-state
residents. Academically the class has a grade point
average of 1.8 on a 3-point scale and a mean LSAT
of approximately 604.
FACULTY RECOGNIZED — Two MarshallWythe faculty members have been honored nationally as "Outstanding Educators of America" this year.
Professor Arthur W. Phelps has authored scholarly
texts in the field of Virginia procedure, evidence,
and domestic law. Associate Professor Robert E. Scott
has made notable achievements in just three years
as an instructor and as Faculty Co-advisor to the
William and Mary Law Review. The "Outstanding
Educators of America" is an annual program to
recognize outstanding leadership and achievement
in the field of education.
NEW LAW BUILDING — Dean James P. Whyte
states that the law school has submitted a request
for planning money for a new low building. The funds
would meet architectural and engineering fees for a
proposed building. The results of this budget request
should be available from the Virginia General Assembly sometime in April of 1972.

LSD-ABARich Ashman, third year law student, was recently
elected Vice-President of the Notional Student Bar
Association.
Ashman was elected July 5 at the annual meeting
in New York City over candidates from the University
of Michigan and the University of Oklahoma.
The session was attended by over 300 delegates
from 90 law schools
Ashman will administer the law school services
fund of $20,000 which is a matching fund program
for local chapters working on various projects.
William & Mary was also honored by receiving the
"Recognition Award" granted to schools with a student bar membership of 75%. The award was granted
to only seven schools in the nation.
Additional representatives from Marshall-Wythe
included Tom Revely, Ron Burgess and Allan EnderlyPresident of the local student bar.
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FOR YOUR THOUGHT
AND INFORMATION
This is an open column where the reader may express any of those fleeting thoughts of brilliance
which we all have at one time or another. Address
your thoughts or information to: Colonial Lawyer,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, 23185. Please
be as concise as possible.

• *

*

We have four law schools in Virginia. The following
is a breakdown of population and number of courses
available.
Students Courses Seminars
Marshall-Wythe

400

46

6

Washington and Lee

200

53

0

University of Virginia

750

101

40

T. C. Williams (Richmond)

200

38

0

• ••••
Effective July 1, 1971, Virginia's new constitution
includes many changes which we hope to report on at
a later date. Among the most needed was a reference
to the right of the people to a clean environment. We
quote from Article XI Sec. 1: "To the end that the
people have clean air, pure water, and the use and
enjoyment for the recreation of adequate public lands;
waters, and other natural resources, it shall be the
policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop,
and utilize its natural resources, its public lands and
its historical sites and buildings. Further it shall be
the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere,
lands and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction for the benefit, enjoyment and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.

*••*•
Florida has recently passed a new set of divorce
laws, often referred to as "No-Fault Divorce." Under
this new system the court is only required to find the
relationship "irretrieveably broken." Also, Men's
Liberation has struck a blow for freedom as the husband will receive equal consideration for custody of
the children and alimony. Perhaps it is about time
for Virginia to reconsider its divorce laws.

If you really want to stop prostitution, simply arrest both parties, after all, as my mother always said,
"It takes two . . . "

• •

*

•

•

Public utilities are supposed to exist for the benefit
of the people, but somehow, after about the third
rate increase, one begins to believe that the utility
officials have justified on existence independent of
the public. As a restraint that is due the public, the
State Corporation Commission (who rules on the rate
increase) should have access to the utilities financial
records and make their results available to the public
. . . anytime they seek a rote increase.

"BY THE PEOPLE .

"

Virg inia
. E lec tion Law
— E. Powell
The root of the governments by and with which the
people of the United States live is the ballot. Year by
year, by machine or paper ballot, the citizens of all
the electoral units of the nation select those individuals who, at least in theory, will serve them in thousands of capacities, both small and great.
The process by which the government is chosen is
delineated in each state by the legislatures. In its
last session, the legislature of Virginia substantially
revised and tightened the election law of that jurisdiction.

1974, and annually thereafter, the name of any voter
who has not voted at least once during four consecutive calendar years will be purged by the general
registrar. This annual automatic purge is badly needed
in areas' like Tidewater. and Northern Virginia where
the transient population is large. As families move to
another state, they may re-register without notifying
the Virginia registrar. Those "Deadwood" names remain on the lists, an open invitation to fraud. In a
recent Charlottesville election, won by one vote, party
members checking the rolls found that a woman, born
in 1840, had voted in 1970. She did not come forward
to have her picture taken for the news media.
Until this time, voter registration rolls have been
held by local electoral boards and registrars, with
little state supervision. Under the new law, by October 1, 1973, the State Board of Elections is to set up
a computerized central registration system.

Virginia, like many of her sister states, has had
to deal with both the elimination of election frauds
and on increasing voting population, which is not
only more numerous, but more mobile. The legislature
has taken steps to correct the problems in both these
areas.

With this in mind, social security numbers are being collected throughout the state. The process of
guaranteeing that no person is registered in each of
several neighboring electoral units has been extremely inefficient, and a laborious process for election
officials and voters alike. The computer system should
ease the strain.

One of the greatest invitations to abuse in any
election is the casting of absentee ballots. "Black
satchelling" these ballots has been a known practice
in some areas of the state. The worker with the black
satchel approaches the voter, provides him with an
application for an absentee ballot, or the ballot itself,
sees how it is voted, and then makes sure it is returned.
If the worker is buying votes, it is his greatest insurance that he gets what he pays for. If he simply wishes
to insure that "his people" are doing right by old
State Senator Whatever, he achieved that goal as well.
The black satchel destroys the secret ballot.

Virginia's new law also moves toward recognizing
the mobile voter by reducing the residence requirements for registration. Under the old low, a citizen
had to be a resident of the state for one year, the
city or county for six months, and the precinct for
thirty days. The new law specifies six months in the
state, and thirty days in the precinct. There are also
special provisions for presidential elections where the
citizen leaves the state during the thirty days prior
to the election. (The voter may return and vote only
for presidential electors.)

The new Virginia law makes real inroads on such
practices. First, only those with a bona fide reason
for being physically unable to reach the polls on election day may cost on absentee ballot by mail. This
category includes the ill or physically handicapped,
military personnel on active duty, business persons
who are regularly employed outside the United States,
such as the merchant marine, and students and their
spouses who are away from their regular residence.
Those voters who ore absent from the district on
election day because of business or vocation or other
personal reasons must appear in person at the office
of the registrar and cast their ballots before that
officer. This in person requirement not only simplifies
the administrative procedure, but, if enforced, should
help to eliminate problems of absentee vote fraud.
Tombstone voting, and its relatives, takes a serious
blow with the institution of a mandatory automatic
purge of the Virginia voting lists, As of December 31,

An important change has been made for the military population. Under the old law, a military person
did not have to appear to register to vote. He could
appear at the polls, sign an affadavit of residence,
and then cast his ballot. The new law requires all
military personnel to register, although military casting absentee ballots may also register by mail.
Because it is far easier to tamper with paper ballots, citizens will be pleased to note that Virginia now
requires most localities to acquire voting machines,
with 1976 as the cut-off date for all precincts having
more than 500 registered voters.
Students of election laws will notice many other
small but important changes in Virginia's rules. Some
improvements appear only in instructions issued for
the State Board of Elections. This brief review can
only note the major changes. However, the people of
Virginia are to be commended for their efforts to
bring their electoriol process into the twentieth century. A major step has been taken.
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THE WETLANDS:

into smaller, edible bits by the yeast and bacteria of
the marsh. This forms a vast food base for insects,
fish, shrimp, crab, oysters, clams, etc., which in turn
form a food base for larger creatures, including man.
Value of the Wetlands

Earth's Precious
Reservoir of Life
How much do they weigh on Equities
balance of economics v. ecology
David Favre

Virginia has 5,432 miles of shoreline, which includes 196 miles of sand, 472 miles of residential or
industrial development, 2,045 miles of dry shore, and
2,719 miles of marsh. While almost everyone is familiar with the sand beaches and dry shores, few
understand the role that marshes play in the coastal
environment. The purpose of this article is to give the
reader a broad understanding of what the marsh and
wetlands are, their value, and to introduce some of
the legal problems involved with protecting the marsh.
In both conversion of sunlight to plant food and
support of a vast variety of animal life, the marshland is one of the most productive environments found
in nature. It also forms buffer zones between saltwater tides, freshwater, and dry land. Although there
is some dispute as to what legally and biologically
constitutes a wetland, it is generally agreed to be that
land found between the average high and low water
marks of any tidal action. While this is certainly the
heart of the marsh, there are also lands above and
below this elevation which are an integral part of the
ecology.
The marsh is normally a large flat area which receives a continuous daily wash of nutrients and sediment from the sea (which acts to suppress "algae
bloom," such as red tides) and the fresh water streams.
In this bed of nutrients, many plants unique to marshland provide food, shelter, and nesting grounds for
thousands of birds and wild animals. It has been estimated by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science
that the production of the Virginia Marsh varies from
three to ten tons per acre per year (wheat yields 1.5
tons and the best hay lands 4 tons). The largest value
of these plants is after they have been broken down
4

For many people, the value of the wetlands lies in
their potential for a housing development or industrial site. In opposition to this school of thought there
have been several attempts to give a monetary value
to the marsh, but knowledge of the interaction of the
living web is so primative that estimates hove varied
from $78 to $525 per acre per year.
Some of the products that come directly from the
marsh include oysters, clams, shrimp, a variety of
waterfowl and the pelts of mink, otter, muskrat, and
raccoon. In Virginia alone, several million dollars
were spent last year by people participating in saltwater fishing and the hunting of waterfowl. It has
been estimated that 80% of the saltwater fish, caught
either commercially or by sportsmen, spend some
critical port of their lives in the marsh environment,
and, of course, without the marsh, the waterfowl could
not exist.
Over and above the actual dollar return of these
lands, however, we must realize that it is impossible
to give a monetary value for much of the marsh. It
is difficult, for example, to put a price on peace and
quiet, marred only now and then by the call of exotic
birds. Who can say what it is worth to watch a white
egret, not in a zoo, but stalking through its native
habitat? Also, how does one put a dollar value on the
role the marsh plays in keeping the salt water away
from high ground or its ability to absorb flood waters?
Legal Problems
Perhaps the largest problem in protecting Virginia's
wetlands lies in determining who owns them. In many
other states this poses no problem as the state has
consistently claimed control of waterways up to the
high tide mark. This is also true of the Federal government which claims regulatory powers over navigable waterways up to the high tide mark. But in the
beginning of Virginia's history there were a number
of land grants from both the London Company and
the Crown which made vague reference to the shore
boundary and, in 1819, the Virginia Legislature passed
a statute making the boundary of privately owned
lands at the average low tide mark. In 1904, the Virginia courts declared that riparian land owners had
several "rights," including: A) a "right of way" from
their property to navigable water, B) the right to
build private piers or wharfs subject to state regulation, C) the right to claim, in fee, land formed by
accretion or alluvium, and D) to make reasonable
use of water flowing past their land.

All of this amounted in reality to no limitation of a
property owners use of his land. Recently the state
has required that before a person can commercially
develop property in tidal areas, he must acquire a permit from the Marine Resources Committee. However,
this committee is not empowered to save the wetlands,
only to control pollution of the waters by that which is
built on the destroyed wetlands.
If it is conceded that Virginia land owners have a
property interest in the wetlands (it could be argued

Perhaps the largest problem in protecting
Virginia's Wetlands lies in determining what
constitutes a Wetland.
that their interest is that of a mere licensee, revocable
at will by the legislature), then how can the state control the private use of them? Inherent in the concept
of the State is that of Police power, which would include the power to regulate the use of land for the
good of the public. This has been practiced for many
years by the use of zoning, but even where land is
zoned the owner is allowed some type of development
upon it. However, the wetlands can tolerate no commercial development. They must remain as nature
built them. Thus, if a certain areas has been determined to be necessary for the ecological balance of
the coastal estuary, the state will have to refuse the
request of any owner therein for any type of commercial or private development; even a simple road may
seriously harm a marsh.area.

Now the question arises: does this constitute the
taking of land by the state without just compensation?
Since this is a strong possibility and most will admit
that the brunt of burden of a wetlands statute will be
born by the individual land owner, it would only seem
fair that the state be capable of giving financial
relief to the riparian owner. To accomplish this there
are several possibilities: A) the agency charged with
protection of the wetlands could also have the power
to eminent domain, B) the state agency could be allowed to purchase easements of wetlands where purchase of the land is prohibitive, and C) there could
be a reduction of property tax for those owners willing
to retain their land in its natural state.
Conclusion
At this time, Virginia is the only state on the eastern seaboard without any type of protection for the
wetlands. The Corps of Engineers is currently doing a
much better job of protecting our wetlands than we
ore. The necessity exists. May the next session of the
Legislature see a statute passed which will allow us to
do the job properly.

There were three basic sources for this article,
all of which I would highly recommend to anyone
interested in the subject: CHESAPEAKE BAY IN
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, by Professor Garrett
Power of the University of Maryland Law School
(Dept. of the Interior, March, 1970), LIFE AND
DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH, by John and
Mildred Teal, Ballantine paperback, and finally,
COASTAL WETLANDS OF VIRGINIA, a report
put out by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science,
(December, 1969).
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CURRICULUM REVIEW
—BRIAN BROMBERGER

The growth and expansion of the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law has brought with it many of the difficulties which confront other law schools throughout
the world, not the least of which is how and what to
teach. These difficulties arise because the aims ; -ambitions and backgrounds of the students become more
varied as their numbers increase and because there
is the desire on behalf of most legal academics to
meet these aims and ambitions within the framework
of the law school. At the same time it must be noted
that within the law teaching profession, there are
variations in ideas as to the function of a law school.
There are those who see a law school as an institution
for the training of people for the practice of law and
there are those who believe that the function of the
law school is multi-purposed and any curriculum must
be designed to meet many requirements. The following takes the second view as given and is only designed to suggest some problems and ideas in on admitted incomplete manner, which I believe arise out
of this concept.
If there is to be an analysis or evaluation or projection of any law school curriculum, it is necessary
to begin with the initial premise that nothing is
sacrosanct; not the three-year law school, not the
first-year curriculum, not the course divisions or the
casebooks that we, as teachers, know and respect. If
a projection for the future is to be meaningful, new
and old teachers alike must be prepared to face the
fact that what we have been teaching and what we
would like to teach may not, in fact, be terribly significant in on ideal scheme of legal education. This
means that we must be prepared to spend a considerable amount of time deciding why we teach the courses
we do and in the manner we do.
Why do we teach torts, or contracts, or property
as separate courses, and why in the first year? Why
do we teach consideration in contracts, or Adams •
Lindsell? At each of these levels of abstraction, we
must justify what we are teaching to ourselves, to our
colleagues and to our students.
It may turn out that most of what we presently do
will merit retention, but if this occurs it will be by
coincidence and if any curriculum study is to be
6

worthwhile, we, as teachers, must be prepared to
sacrifice some very familiar life patterns.
The fundamental question is: Who are we trying
to educate? The substantial changes which have occured at law schools across the country makes the
answer to this question almost impossible. We have
only the remotest idea of what kinds of jobs our
future graduates will hold down during their professional careers. We do know that the change in the
composition of this law school will mean that the
interests and career plans of the students will be far
more diverse than they were twenty years ago. It is
our job then, to reassess what we are trying to teach
our graduates to be. It is possible at this stage to
introduce some categories. There will be the general

practitioner who we are training to be able to handle
a typical small office with its wide range of typical
problems presented by typical individual clients. There
will be the specialist practitioner, who will move into
a larger firm and spend most of his time drafting wills,
creating and dissolving charitable corporations, negotiating labor contracts or transferring real property.
There will be the policymaker in business and legislature. There will be the scholars who are interested in
the workings of the legal process as a means of solving
society's problems and analyzing its structure and
development. Lastly (for the purpose of this paper),
we are simply training people to be better able to
understand events because of their exposure to problems of government and lawmaking in all its forms.
It is the prototype of the type of person we are trying to turn out from law school that must determine
the content of the law course which we offer.
I would suggest that no matter into which group
an individual student placed himself, there would be
some common thread in his legal education. Each
student must be given an introduction to the legal
process, the various institutions created by society to
resolve its disputes, and should also be given training
in "thinking like a lawyer." This would include respect for facts, ability to analyze and synthesize
cases and an habitual skepticism toward undocumented assertions and generalizations. It is suggested
that this can be quite adequately carried out in the

first year of law school and from thereon the paths of
our prototypes would diverge, but nevertheless, it must
be remembered that the law school is training lawyers.
The determination of what makes a lawyer discernibly
different from the political scientist will largely dictate the way in which these divergent paths are trodden. It has been suggested that a lawyer possesses a
particular attitude toward the handling of facts given
to him by others and if we can discover any other
attributes which we want to cultivate, we can understand better what it is we wont to teach and how we
should do it.
WHY THE THREE YEAR LAW SCHOOL?
Almost fifty years ago the American Association
of Law Schools wrote the three year law school into
'law' and made it the basis of its system of accreditation. The A.A.L.S. also required that each student
must hove the equivalent of two years of college
prior to his admission into law school. It is worth
noting that until well into the 1930's, most law schools
were accepting students who had only obtained a
high school diploma. In this context the three year
law school takes on an entirely different hue. Today,
of course, things are vastly different. Students come
to law school with four years of college training and
many come with advanced academic degrees. The
construction of the three year format cannot be justified by the same reasons that existed fifty years ago.
If we try to justify the three year program on the
basis of the introduction of new fields of law, then

if

. . New and old teachers alike must be

prepared to face the fact that what we have
been teaching and what we would like to
teach may not, in fact, be terribly significate
in an ideal scheme of legal education."

new questions become apparent. Why must we teach
every law student these recently evolved subjects and,
if these subjects are evolving so, rapidly, is it realistic
to believe that that which we teach now will be of
value in five years time? It may be that the present
justification for the three year course is purely pragmatic. The third year helps finance the enterprise;
if we abandon it we would lose our A.A.L.S. accreditation, and our student bar admission in practically
every state would be in jeopardy.
WHY THE PRESENT FIRST YEAR STRUCTURE?
Langdell believed that the subject matter of our
familiar first year curriculum was basic to the science
of low. Now, more than seventy-five years later, we
have substantially the some curriculum. [it should
be noted here that the introduction of the Adminis-

Professor Bromberger is a new addition to the Marshall-Wythe
Faculty. Having taught previously in Australia where he was born,
he has been in the U. S. only three years, one of which was as a
professor at the University of Pennsylvania.

trative Law and Legislation course in 1971 at this
law school shows a moving away from this philosophy."'
It is suggested however, that the subject matter
is really only the vehicle which carries the purposes
of the first year program. During his first year the
student should be made familiar with legal institutions — their purposes, methods, limitation and development. It has been long accepted that an intensive consideration of one institution, the judiciary,
was preferable to that of a rounded picture of them
all — judicial, legislative and executive, The inadequacy of the former is especially true today when
more and more law is being created by the legislative
and executive-administrative branches of government. The first year should include skill training.
Traditionally, the emphasis has been upon the skills
of case analysis, but should we not at least try to
introduce other lawyer-like skills? We can only
justify our exclusive diet of case analysis, if it
is indeed the most fundamental, and takes two
semester, in all first year courses to complete.
This assumption is at best doubtful. Would it not be
more economical to use a part of the first year program, maybe two or three courses, for this purpose
thus creating time for a concentration in other skills.
It is not suggested that the other courses should totally ignore it, but rather de-emphasize it and thus give
a more accurate picture of what it really means to
"think like a lawyer." Training in lawyer-like skills
and acquaintance with different legal institutions can
be carried out by selecting from an enormous number
of courses. What makes a particular subject matter
especially appropriate for inclusion in a first year
curriculum? The subject matter is especially appropriate for instruction in a particular skill or institution, (e. g, in civil procedure, the historical emergence
of the equity court and equitable remedies.) The sub(Continued on Page 12)
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SCHOOL INTEGRATION:
RECONSTRUCTION REVISITED, OR
A RAWER OF BLACK AND WHITE
-NATALIE C. GILLETTE

The current legal struggle over public school integration began with Brown seventeen years ago. The
Supreme Court found that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.' They said that since
the state undertakes to provide education for all
children it must provide it to all on equal terms. Even
though the "tangible" factors may be equal, segregation of blacks "solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority . . . that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone," and
that the "sense of inferiority affects the motivation
of the child to learn."
As the subsequent history has shown, the Brown
decision left many questions unanswered. The only
mention of de jure, as opposed to de facto, segregation came in a quote from the lower court, which had
said that segregation "with the sanction of law" was
of greater psychological harm than that without.'
The Supreme Court itself spoke only of the inherent
unconstitutionality of segregation and the necessity
for its elimination with 'all deliberate speed."
Most of the other difficulties that have plagued
school integration were foreshadowed in Brown as
well. The lower courts were ordered to appraise
school board plans and to retainjurisdiction until a
workable plan was put into effect. The burden to show
good faith compliance was put on defendant school
boards. The courts in their appraisals of plans were to
consider the physical condition of the school plant,
the transportation system, personnel, revision of attendance zones and school districts, and local laws
and regulations. The unconstitutional discrimination
was to cease; but the law had embarked on one more
treacherous quagmire of definition, and the Pandora's
box of methods was opened wide.

Busing
Recent cases are in agreement on one vital point.
The time for deliberate speed has passed; integration
is required now.' Most other questions, including
how to accomplish desegregation, remain in conflict.
The one criterion consistently applied has been simply, "Does it work?,"' but some courts have refused
to make this their prime consideration.
'

. . . "Despite the current furor over busing,
the methods of integration raise far less
important legal questions than the definition of what, exactly, is unconstitutional..."

The most controversial method urged has been
busing. Some courts have refused to order busing to
achieve integration even when no other method was
possible.' The anti-busing provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964' has been largely ignored. One court recently construed that statute as refusing any new
power to the courts, but not as precluding their ordering desegregation plans which happen to include
busing. Other courts have ordered busing plans without reference to the statute, including the Eastern District of. Virginia."
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Swann"
supports these orders. The Swann decision's strong
call for elimination of all vestiges of stote-imposed
segregation in public education plus its statement that
busing is not unreasonable can be construed as a
mandate that busing be ordered when necessary to
eliminate vestigial segregation.
While Nixon's recent statements opposing busing
may reduce the vigor of H.E.W.'s insistence on busing
plans, the courts are less likely to bow to the President's wishes. Even if Nixon acceded to the demonstrators' demands to order an end to busing for integration purposes, which is highly unlikely, black parents would doubtless bring new court actions, and
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courts would make the some kinds of orders they have
been making. Faced with a choice between contempt
of court and disobedience of Nixon, school boards
would obey court orders, since the President could not
enforce his order effectively and the courts can.
Nixon's views and Governor Wallace's proposed legislation in Alabama may delay integration by busing,
but are not likely to stop it. A constitutional amendment could of course, but seems unlikely to be
adopted. In any event, integration and busing need
not, in most cases, rise or fall together. Redrawing
school districts, for example, can have the same effect
De Jure and De Facto
Despite the current furor over busing, the methods
of integration raise far less important legal questions
than the definition of what, exactly, is unconstitutional. No one yet has answered the question clearly
for de facto segregation. If all-black schools are inherently unequal, is public support of an all-black
school discriminatory state action in itself? If not,

... is it not time for the law to admit that
an all-white school can be perfectly constitutional but that an all-black school denies equal protection of the laws. . ."

what activities of state and local governments — such
as residential zoning, placement of public assistance
housing, and site choices for schools — are to be
considered legal causes of segregated schools?
The, Supreme Court relied on psychological evidence in finding that segregated schools are inherently unequal." Psychologists, despite the Court's suggestion that de jure is worse than de facto segregation, agree that segregation impairs self-esteem and
motivation to learn no matter what its cause." Some
courts have adopted that finding." Most often, however, the law insists on finding some state action beyond the fact of all-block schools."

The Supreme Court's Swann decision does not settle
the question." The opinion does clearly state that
one-race school's are not per se unconstitutional, but
it is not at all clear what constitutes state action. Deliberately maintained "dual school systems" may require "awkward, inconvenient and even bizarre"
remedies, but once the damage is undone there may well
be no further need for legal measures to enforce integration. On the other hand, the Court expressly declined to decide whether or not other state action than
that of school boards can create unconstitutional
segregation. If school board action is state action, as
the latter clearly implies, then the Court has not said
that only states where segregation was once required
by law are now obliged to integrate the schools, despite
the equally clear implication to the contrary in the
former statement.
The executive branch of our government, in the
form of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, has attempted to fill the gap from another
direction." So has Congress." Both provided that no
federal financial aid would be given to any program
or activity that discriminates on the basis of race.
Both clearly apply to schools everywhere in the country, but they are still not as much help as might be
expected. Neither the statute, which the courts, of
course, must follow, nor the non-binding guidelines
define discrimination, but, as usual, leave that task
to the courts, and the courts are for from any consensus.
In Congress last spring, Senator Ribicoff proposed
establishment of a time-table and suggested methods
for metropolitan integration," but he .labelled his proposal a "policy," and, even if it is passed, it is unlikely to be more definitive than current law.
The school boards have not done well at taking the
initiative required of them by Brown." Judicial review
of each case on its own merits presents many difficulties. When school board plans are inadequate, the
court must retain jurisdiction and rule on the next
plan the board devises, a process which can continue
for years, and, when a case is appealed, it is sometimes too late to enforce a specific ruling for a specific school year. At least one court has concluded,
despite the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the H.E.W.
(Continued on Page 13)

In a recent Virginia case, the court saw differing
requirements directed to formerly de jure segregated
schools and those segregated only de facto: there is a
negative mandate to the Jotter to end "effective exclusion" of blacks from white schools, while the former have an affirmative duty to correct the segregation
caused by earlier statutes." The suggestion seems
to be that where state action causing segregation was
overt, the state must act to integrate the resulting
all-block schools, but where it was and is more subtle,
the state must only cease its discriminatory policies.
The idea seems at best to be very odd. One could
easily argue that the result would be an unlawful discrimination against the southern states, and our
country's reconstruction policy is, hopefully, a thing
of the distant past.
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This is meant to be a continuing column where the results of those November elections show up in their
final form, the recorded votes of the House and Senate. This is just a sampling of all the votes taken, but
hopefully enough to aid you in deciding if your elected officials are representing your point of view. These examples were selected from the votes taken between January and the August recess of this year.
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BOOK REVIEW -

"WOODMAN SPARE THAT TREE . . ."
—by E. Powell

Defending the Environment — A Strategy for Citizen
Action. Joseph L Sax. Knopf, N.Y. 1971, h.b.
$6.95.
After you have read all the books on the news stand
that say all those things about pesticides and sewage,
litter and eutrophocotion, and you begin to watch the
world deteriorate around you from your bicycle seta—
this book is where the action is. The title is deceptive;
the book is more a suggestion of a remedy than strategy, more analysis of the reasons for citizen impotence
than a setting forth of things to do while you wait
for the bulldozers.
The author, Joseph Sax, is a Professor of Law at
the University of Michigan, who is working to revise
the law of envioronmental protection. Specifically,
he has written a law which establishes court actions
for citizens by which plans for buildings, highways,
airports, etc. can be remanded to the legislature, enjoined, or subjected to a moratorium by court order.
Sax is not alone in his mistrust of administrative
agencies, but he may be alone in his approach to that
mistrust. No agency, by Sax's standards, can truly
defend "the public interest." Agencies are cumbersome, subject to political pressures, victims of the
'insider perspective.' Agencies make strings of excep-

tions to rules until the rules themselves have disappeared.
Sax sees the courts as the only place sufficiently
objective to truly defend the environment, and the
initiative of the private citizen the best repository of
the "public trust." It would be hard not to agree.
The case is made in the opening pages of the book
by a detailed report of the fight to save a part of the
Potomac estuary called Hunting Creek. Before the
reader's eyes, Senator's aides, Congressmen, and
Governor's of Virginia wind a dance around bureaucrats watching their own interests and the media. A
famous wildlife reporter and a little old lady on the
telephone, hearings, the whole gamut of pro and anti
forces pick and ramble through years of decision. It
would be unfair to announce the winning side in this
review, and perhaps it would be impossible.
The State of Michigan has adopted Sax's law. Its
passage has been noted approvingly by such giant's
of the media as the Wall Street Journal, and The New
Yorker. It seems that other legislatures should carefully consider the citizen's remedies in their states,
and the passage of the same or similar legislation.
The case is well-made, the book is readable, if
somewhat repetitious. It should be on the reading,
list of all ecology buffs.

Senate
I. Voting Rights Amendment — to lower voting
age to 18; adopted 64-17.

8.

Amendment to Draft Bill declaring that it should
be the U.S. policy to leave Viet Nam at the
earliest possible date—within 9 months of enactment, subject to release of all POWs; adopted
61-38.

9.

Emergency Public Service Employment Act, $2.25
Billion; adopted 75-11.

10.

Amendment deleting the space shuttle program
and other reductions in NASA budget; rejected
22-64.

2.

Nomination of G. Harrold Carswell; rejected
45-51.

3.

McGovern-Hatfield Amendment — limiting the
number of troops in Viet Nam after April 1,
1971; rejected 39-55.

4.

Amendment deleting funds for the SST from
budget; adopted 52-41.

5.

Vote to table the "Home Rule" amendment for
Washington, D.C.; adopted 68-23.

11.

6.

Resolution proposing the Constitutional Amendment to lower the voting age to 18; adopted 94-0.

Amendment to limit the subsidies of farmers to
$20,000, except for wool or sugar; rejected 29-56.

12.

7.

Amendment to extend the draft for one year
instead of two; rejected 43-49.

Amendment to increase funds for school lunch
program by $16.9 Billion; adopted 56-28.
(Continued on Page 12)
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Curriculum

(Continued from Page 7)

ject matter is such that it presents certain concepts
which are so fundamental that an educated lawyer
must have on acquaitntance with them (e.g. proximate cause, reasonable man). The subject matter
affords a suitable starting point for more advanced
courses in later years. The subject matter is exciting
or easy to grasp and acts as a source to an otherwise
strange and difficult and sometimes dull bill of fare.
With these facts in mind, various aspects of various courses lose their significance. Con we explain
the usual presence in contracts of public reward offers, offers which lapse or are subconsciously revoked
or cross in the moil, or the supposed Constable which
turns out to be a tenth grader's examination project,
on the basis that they provide the student with a
better way of learning to "think like a lawyer" than
would a dozen other conceivable first year courses.
It is quite possible that this approach would result in
the first year curriculum looking very little like the
way it does at the moment. Some courses which have
traditionally been second and third year electives
might leap to the fore as being eminently suitable for
a first year course. An example of this could be a
course in Family Law.

than most traditional courses to evoke an emotional
response on the part of the student, since many of
the problems have moral overtones and many indeed
are problems which actually have touched the lives
of our students. It is valuable for the student to have
these emotional responses confronted and channelized
within the broader framework of reason and of legal
institutions.
A course in family law has some drawbacks. I doubt
that the subject matter itself is so fundamental and
pervasive that it con be said to be an indispensible
part of every lawyer's intellectual training. There is
also a risk in offering such a course in the first year—
where the great emphasis is otherwise upon rigorous
case analysis — that students will take less seriously
any course in which that type of analysis ploys a
relatively small role. While that risk cannot be eliminated altogether, it is likely to be minimized by the
existence of other first-year courses which depart
somewhat from an exclusive emphasis on case materials. This is not intended to be a plea for the introduction of Family Law into the first year curriculum
(although it may indeed be suitable). Family Law is
only used here to show the need for continued and
continual reappraisial of the offerings of a typical
law school so that it provides a legal education that
is both sound and relevant.

FAMILY LAW
The Family Law course would uniquely expose the
student to a range of problems otherwise wholly ignored in the typical first-year curriculum. First, it
offers the opportunity to examine the relationship between the individual and the state in an area of special
sensitivity and interest: the individual as he relates
to those within the family unit. The problems ore
thus quite distinct from the usual problems of government regulation in the more commonly explored examples of the accused criminal or the interstate business. Second, the law is developing afresh at the
intersection of family law and constitutional law. The
course provides an excellent vehicle for extrapolating
the doctrines of due process, equal protection and the
like — into such problems as illegitimacy, privacy,
custody and welfare. Third, the course is also a natural vehicle for the introduction of learning from the
behavioral sciences, not only psychiatry but also
sociology, criminology and economics. Fourth, and
related, the types of written materials with which the
students will deal can more readily diverge from the
usual judicial fare, so as to include, for example,
transcripts of proceedings and interviews, evaluations
by psychiatrists, source material in the behavioral
sciences. Fifth, the course affords an opportunity for
a special kind of skill-training which the law school
has notoriously neglected (at least as required learning): interviewing and counseling. It appears undeniable that not only are these activities ones in which
the lawyer will be engaged, but they are also in themselves worthy of investigation and analysis as part of
the process of learning about the legal profession and
the legal system. Sixth, the student is forced to examine certain basic assumptions about the role of
lawyers and the viability of the adversary system in
solving what is classified as a "legal" problem but
which obviously has broader social and scientific implications. Seventh, the course offers an unusual opportunity to explore problems of legal ethics. Eighth,
the subject matter of the course is much more likely
12

(Continued from Page 11)

House
1. Vote to table the motion instructing the House
Conference to accept the Senate's rejection of
SST funds; adopted 216-203.
2.

Amendment to delete SST funds; adopted 216203.

3.

Amendment extending draft for 1 year instead
of 2; rejected 198-200.

4.

Amendment to continue the present two year
alternative service for Consciencious Objectors
instead of the proposed three year term; rejected
132-242.

5.

Revival of SST funds for building of prototype;
adopted 216-203.

6.

Resolution to stop the railroad strike with a
13.5% pay increase; passed 264-93.

7.

Welfare Social Security Bill, increasing benefits
and establishing a national family assistance
program for incapacitated or unemployable
adults; passed 288-132.

8.

Amendment setting $20,000 limitation on subsidy payments to farmers, except sugar and wool;
adopted 214-198.

9.

Bill providing on administrative assistant for
Chief Justice of U.S.; passed 263-139.

Integration

(Continued from Page 9)

guidelines, that more help is needed from the executive and legislative branches of the federal government; "the courts acting alone hove failed.' It is
little wonder, for no one has defined what they are
required to do.
Black and White
There is one distinction which is openly made by
scientists, but which the law has shied away from.
Psychologists tell us that all-black schools are injurious to the children who attend them. The law finds
that separate facilities are inherently unequal. The
scientists tell us that the white child's education loses
nothing by his attending an all-white school." The
courts carefully refer to one-race schools and find no
inequality per se in such schools.
Is it not time for the law to admit that on all-white
school can be perfectly constitutional but that on allblack school denies equal protection of the laws? The
law adopted the findings of psychology in 1954; let
the law now finish the job it has undertaken by admitting that one-sided harm — unequal protection —
demands remedies only for those harmed. Once the
law officially recognizes the difference between "onerace" and "all-black," a definition of what has been
declared unconstitutional is relatively easy. Until
then, definition is impossible.
Every child cannot attend an integrated school.
There are not enough black children to go around;
there are too many all-white communities in America.
It is not impossible, however, to require that every

black child attend an integrated school, and that is
all that the facts of inequality demand.
Conclusions
There are too many racially mixed school systems
in this country for the courts or the federal executive
agencies to pass on the sufficiency of every plan for
integration that is proposed or put into effect by each
school board. The courts have borne the burden essentially alone, and they have succeeded amazingly
well. They cannot finish the job alone. The fourteenth
amendement is carrying just about all the judicial
gloss it will support in this area. Cutting off federal
aid, the only genuine weapon available to the executive branch of our government, is a negative and uncertain way to achieve integration. Only Congressional
action can solve the problem efficiently.
Congress need not draft a statute telling the school
boards how to achieve integration. The possible
methods are well-known, much discussed, and well
adjudicated. If the courts' mandates to integrate now
are to have full meaning and effect, Congress must
pass a clearly specific law requiring nationwide elimination of identifiably black schools and imposing effective penalities for school boards that violate the
requirements.
The primary problem would be getting such a law
passed, but a coalition of northern and western liberals and southern legislators, who object to the focus
on segregated public schools only in the South, might
accomplish it. It is well worth a try, for the all-black
school, with its demoralizing effects and its unconstitutional inequality, must go.
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COURT APPOINTED
COUNSEL
IN VIRGINIA:
Genuine Aid to the Indigent?

Les Bailey

On June 23, 1971 United States District Judge
Marvin E. Frankel ordered Norman Thomas released
from New York's Green Haven State Prison subject to
being re-tried by the state within thirty days. Represented by a string of at least five Legal Aid Society
lawyers, Thomas suffered what Judge Frankel called
"the most brutal and horrifying kind of isolation, effectively walled off for months from any genuine assistance by a facade of representation." According to
Judge Frankel, despite several hand written pleas by
Thomas to the state court asking for freedom by writ
of habeas corpus and for assignment of different lawyers, Thomas' pretrial ordeal was highlighted by the
failure of Legal Aid Lawyers to either visit him or to
call witnesses which he requested. (New York Times,
June 24, 1971.)
Thomas' ordeal prompts one to ponder the practical
meaning of a basic Constitutional right of an accused
. to have the assistance of counsel for his defense
. . . in all criminal prosecutions . . . ". (U.S. Const.
amend. VI.) Reflections upon this right in the context
of the increasing need for competent legal representation for indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions
encouraged a series of interviews with members of
the Williamsburg and York County Bars. This article
attempts to briefly examine Virginia's response to the
need for adequate representation for indigent criminal defendants in the light of a limited number of
interviews, pertinent statutes, and case law.
Legal Aid Society, Public Defender, Court Appointed Counsel: these three characterize the basic
approaches to providing counsel in this country for
those facing criminal charges who are financially
unable to retain private counsel. (Monson, The Indigent in Virginia, 51 Va. L. Rev. 163(1965). The Legal
Aid Society is used in some of the larger cities such
as Norfolk with its Tidewater Legal Aid Society, and
the Public Defender System is authorized in certain
counties with very high population density, but apparently this authorization has not been employed.
The Legal Aid Society is a private organization funded
predominantly from private sources, whereas a Public
Defender System is an official organ of government
staffed by lawyers whose salary is paid from public
funds. The Court Appointed or . . . assigned
counsel system consists . .. of the appointment of
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individual attorneys to represent indigent (criminal)
defendants on a case-by-case basis." (Id. at 176)
" . . . Virginia and the vast majority of states have
relied on the assigned (court appointed) counsel system to provide representation for indigents." (Id. at
175). Although the Court Appointed Counsel system
perhaps locks the efficiency and specialized expertise
of the Public Defender system, it more than compensates by its virtues of simplicity, minimum organization, individual treatment for each client, and lock
of potential suspicion possible where the public defender works for the government.
Until 1963 the Sixth Amendment was not interpreted as compelling the states to provide counsel in
non-capital cases for those unable to afford private
counsel. That year in Gideon v. Wainwright the United
States Supreme Court held that in all cases in which
a felony is charged the state must provide counsel if
the defendant is financially incapable of providing
his own.
As early as 1940 the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that " . . . courts of record having
criminal jurisdiction possess the inherent authority,
independent of statute, to appoint counsel to defend
paupers . . . charged with crime." (Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518 at 522, (1940)). The
Virginia Code is now explicit in requiring that in all
cases involving felony charges the defendant be represented at "every stage of the proceeding . . .
before any court . . " (including preliminary hearings before courts not of record to determine whether
there is probable cause prerequisite to certifying the
case to a grand jury). The Code further provides that,
once appointed, counsel " . . . shall represent defendant until relieved (by the court appointing him)
or replaced in a manner prescribed by law. ' (Va.
Code sec. 19.1-241.1 (1966)).
So zealous has the Virginia high court been in implementing Gideon that in 1965 it held that " . . .
failure to appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant in making an appeal from conviction is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws and due
process guaranteed him under the Federal Constitution and the Virginia Bill of Rights." (Cabaniss v.
Cunningham, 206 Va. 330, (1965)), and in 1968 it
held that a defendant's confession to a felony obtained without advising him of his right to a court
appointed counsel prior to questioning was not admissible in evidence. (Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 219
Va. 68, (1968)).
The Code of Virginia provides that all who are
charged with a felony must first "be brought before"
a judge of a court not of record where the judge must
inform the accused of his right to counsel and boil
amount, after which the accused is given a reasonable
time to hire his own lawyer or execute an affidavit
that he is too poor to afford a lawyer. (Va. Code secs.
19.1-241.2, 241.3 (1966)). Prior to executing the affidavit of indigency the accused will face an oral
examination by the judge who will use the information
thereby obtained and "other competent evidence" to
determine whether defendant is indigent "within the
contemplation of law" (a rather vaguely defined
standard). If the court finds the accused indigent, it
then requires him to execute a statement under oath
that he ' . . . is without means to employ counsel of

(his) own choosing . . . . a thorough investigation
(into the accused's financial status) is seldom . .
conducted . . . (but) his statement (of indigency)
is sometimes checked with information known to or
easily obtainable by the commonwealth attorney, the
arresting officer, or any other official connected with
the case." (Manson, 51 Va. L. Rev. 163 at 165.)
Attorneys are customarily appointed in this area
orally by the judge from a list of attorneys known by
him to be willing to serve. Attorneys are not required
by statute to accept appointment, but it is generally
felt that a lawyer's position as an officer of the court
obligates him to accept such appointments as a matter of judicial ethics. Continuances will be given if
the court appointed counsel needs unexpected additional time to properly prepare for trial. (Va. Code
sec. 19.1-241.4 (1964)). Counsel is usually selected
in this area on the basis of the compatibility of his
known attitudes with the nature of the charge and
the age of the defendant as well as upon the basis of
the kind and amount of his trial experience. Thus
when possible, no attorney, say, who is known to have
a "hard-nosed" attitude towards drug offenders would
be assigned to defend a minor accused of trafficking
in narcotics. The importance of establishing rapport
between minor defendants and their parents and the
court appointed counsel cannot be over emphasized.
A major problem with the system of appointed
counsel is inadequate pay for services rendered. Counsel is authorized compensation for representing one
charged with a felony at a preliminary hearing in a
court not of record in an amount set by the judge

thereof, but not to exceed $75.00. (Va. Code sec.
19.1-241.5 (1968)). This inadequate limit is somewhat alleviated where, in the usual case, counsel continues his services in a court of record, When the
statutory maximum punishment authorized for the
charge is death or confinement in the penitentiary for
in excess of twenty years, the court may allow counsel
up to $400.00 and for the defense in case of a lesser
felony up to $200.00. The court will also direct payment of reasonable expenses incurred by counsel appropriate to the circumstances with the defendant
being liable to reimburse all amounts disbursed for
his defense to the Commonwealth if he is convicted.
(Va. Code sec. 14.1-184).
The shocking inadequacy of representation that
plagued the New York Thomas case would be unlikely to occur in this area. By local practice the judge
asks counsel in open court prior to conclusion of the
case how many times and how long he has met with
the accused as well as how much time counsel has
spent in preparing the defense. The judge then asks
the accused the same first two questions as well as
whether counsel has advised the accused of accused's
right to waive preliminary hearing, to remain silent,
and to call witnesses. The accused is then asked
whether he is satisfied with current counsel and
whether there is any reason why the case cannot proceed. The answers to all of these questions are filed
to be readily available should the accused later ask
that his conviction be overturned by writ of habeas
corpus on the ground of inadequate representation of
counsel.

15

Alumni News
The Colonial Lawyer is pleased to introduce the
addition of Alumni News with this issue. With the
improvements and growth at Marshall-Wythe, there
has been on increase in alumni interest. To satisfy
such encouraging interest and to supplement the
periodic coverage in Alumni Briefs, this column will
be expanded in future Colonial Lawyer issues.
Class of '52
Boyd, Davis and Payne is the new firm name for
Robert F. Boyd. His address is Suite 1240, Virginia
National Bank Building, One Commercial Place,
Norfolk, Virginia 23510.
Wilson 0. Edmonds' new mailing address is P. 0.
Box 328, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830.
Class of '61
John M. Court is now serving as Assistant County
Solicitor for Ann Arundul County, Maryland, while
continuing his private practice in Maryland and Virginia.
Class of '62
W. Kendall Lipscomb is legal counsel for and one
of the founders and directors of "The Colonial Bank"
in Providence Forge, Virginia.
Class of '64
Richard E. Crouch is associated with the firm of
Wells and Hodgson with offices at 2001 Jefferson
Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia.
Hugh Scott Hester's new address is P. 0. Box 355,
Reidsville, North Carolina 27320.
Class of '65
L. Barry Hill is practicing law in Sudbury, Massachusetts. He is serving his third term as Treasurer of
Sudbury Water District and also is acting as President
of the Sudbury Rotary Club.
Class of '66
Lloyd C. Sullenberger is now a member of the firm
of Shackelford and Robertson, Attorneys at Law.
Class of '67
The new office address for William C. Atack is
Baltimore Law Reform Unit, 412 North Bond Street,
Baltimore, Maryland 21231.
Class of '68
Robert A. Handel is a partner in the firm of Kamberg, Bermant and Handel, located at 31 Elm Street,
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Springfield, Massachusetts. Bob is also President of
Legal Computer Services, Inc., in Springfield.
Sal J. Jesuele is a partner in the firm of Oliva,
Dawdell and Jesuele in Fort Lee, New Jersey. Sal is a
former member of the Fort Lee Board of Adjustment
and Appeals and in addition to coaching the Fort Lee
Junior Football League, is presently a trustee for the
Fort Lee Board of Education and a member of the
Fort Lee Environmental Protection Committee.
Russell A. Kimes, Jr., is a Captain and Assistant
Staff Judge Advocate at Plottsburg AFB. His present
address is 908B Nevada Circle, Plattsburg AFB, New
York 12903.
Class of '69
James 0. Kemper, Jr., is Captain in the Judge Advocate General's Corps at P. 0. Box 695, Selfridge
AFB, Michigan 48405. Jim will go to a new duty station in Vietnam in October.
Robert A. Lawman has opened his law office in
First and Merchant's Bank Building in Radford, Virginia.
Another class member in the Judge Advocate General's Corps is Christopher Sutton who is on duty with
the 164th Aviation Group in South Vietnam.
Class of '70
Anthony Gaeta, Jr., presently Assistant Transportation School Brigade Legal Officer at Fort Eustis,
Virginia, willjoin the New York City law firm of
Simpson, Thacker and Bartlett in August, 1972.
Walter B. Golden Ill is now an associate with
Thomas J. Rathrock, Attorney and Counsellor at Law,
with offices at 9701 Main Street, P. 0. Box 325,
Fairfax, Virginia 22030.
Richard G. Poinsett's new address is 14508 Lanica
Circle, Chantilly, Virginia 22021.
John J. Sabourin, Jr., now lives at 10317 Compton
Road, Apt. 603, Corpus Christi, Texas 78418.
William L Scott, Jr., is now associated with Swayze,
Parris, Cowlus and Tydings at 4085 Chain Bridge
Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030.
Class of '71
Nicholas J. DeRoma is living now at 256-D Williamsburg East Apartments, Rt. 143, Williamsburg,
Virginia 23185.
There are certainly other address changes, new
firm associations, civic achievements, and elected
positions not mentioned here that would interest your
fellow alumni. Please let us know at:
The Colonial Lawyer
Thomas W. Wright, Alumni News Editor
Marshall-Wythe School of Law
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185
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